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The financial crisis shocked the whole capital market in 2008; the global economy began 
to stick in another dilemma after the great depression in the 1930s. Since underpricing is 
commonly existed in stock markets, and underpricing itself is always measured by initial 
return rate, which reflects the potential value in initial day and the investing perspective, 
therefore, in order to identify the effects of financial crisis on U.S. stock market, we will 
analyze initial return to see if this crisis did affect IPOs. In this paper, we picked up 343 
IPOs of financial sector in NYSE from 2006 to 2010, then studied in the regression 












1.1 An Overview of Financial Crisis in 2008 
In 2008, with the unprecedented number of companies claiming bankruptcy and 
huge amount of cost for governments’ bail-out plans, the global market had begun to 
enter the first financial crisis in 21
st
 century. 
The crisis lasted from 2007, with the bursting of housing bubbles, to 2010 in the 
American domestic financial system. However, its aftermath is not over yet, Jones (2007) 
suggested, due to tremendous national debt and negative national competitiveness. The 
timetable to return to stability is unpredictable.  
During the crisis, especially in 2008, the U.S. government bought Fannie Mae 
(FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE) which both are non-bank institutions doing business on 
mortgage, and turned them into state-owned firms. Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy 
on September 14 after failing to find a buyer; no one was willing to buy it including 
government since its deficit was approximately $613 billion. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) announced a temporary emergency ban on short selling in 
the stocks of financial companies. Bank of America purchased Merrill Lynch (MER), and 
American International Group (AIG) was rescued by the federal government with an $85 
billion capital injection. Later, on September 25th, JP Morgan Chase (JPM) agreed to buy 
the assets of Washington Mutual (WM) which was the biggest bank failure in U.S. 




preferred stocks of 23 U.S. banks through the Capital Purchase Program. More and more 
public firms had filed for bankruptcy than in 2007. 
Jickling (2010) pointed out, based on the previous practices; Federal Reserve 
System (Fed) had used a series of financial tools which were commonly taken in the 
Asian crises of 1997-1998, the stock market crashes of 1987 and 2000-2001, the junk 
bond debacle in 1989, the savings and loan crisis, 9/11, and so on. But it was 
unsuccessful. As mentioned above, the subprime loan crisis caused by housing bubbles 
was the origin. Moreover, lack of transparency and accountability in mortgage finance, 
indecision of rating agencies, invisible off-balance sheet finance and failure of risk 
management systems should also be considered in this crisis.  
Although the central bank had tried calming, the situation was still deteriorating 
in 2008. By early 2009, the specialists found that the financial system and the global 
economy appeared to be stuck in a descending spiral, and the primary focus of policy 
became the prevention of a prolonged downturn on the order of the Great Depression. 
The volume and variety of negative financial news, and the seeming uselessness of policy 
feedbacks, have raised new questions about the main origin of financial crises and the 
market mechanisms. The economic influence of financial market failures in the 1930s 
remains an active academic subject; it is possible that the causes and outcomes of the 
current crisis would also be debated for decades to come. 
In September, 2008, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated 1.5 




Actually, after the new statistics came out, it showed that CBO prediction was estimated 
high.  
Figure 1: Impact of the Crisis on Economy-wide Output 
Figure 1 plots actual real GDP and GDP that was announced by the CBO’s 
forecasting and the CBO’s calculation of potential GDP. As shown on the chart, GDP fell 
at the end of 2008 and into early 2009, falling by 5.4 percent and 6.4 percent in the last 







1.2 The IPO’s Trend 
After World War II, the global economy seemed to hit bottom. Nations were 
eager to search new ways to achieve growth. After the war th U.S. economy had 
advantages in physical assets and human resources that other countries did not. That led 
to the development of the U.S. economy.  
The IPO (Initial Public Offering) is now a main approach for a company to go 
public and raise more financial capital. Raising allows investors to earn from newly 
public companies which are experiencing rapid growth. Displayed in Figure 2, the 
momentum of the IPO is quite good before the terrorist attacks on the U.S. on September 
11, 2001. After the attacks, the number of IPOs suddenly dropped. In 2008, there was 
another decline. Therefore, the crisis, somewhat, affected the volume of new issues. 
Figure 2: The Trend of U.S. IPO and Unemployment Rate 
Source: Grant Thornton LLP, Dealogic and U.S. Department of Labor 




1.3 The Importance of the Study 
This paper is mainly focusing on checking if the financial crisis had significantly 
influenced the U.S. IPO. In Chapter 2, there will be a series of arguments and opinions on 
IPO derived from other papers and journals written by experts and analysts to further 
support ideas. In Chapter 3, a regression model will be created and used to verify the 
financial crisis did or did not affect stocks’ initial return rate by introducing different 
variables which are highly related to the rate. Through the comparison between rates 
calculated from data of 400 stocks in the financial industry during pre- and post-crisis 
periods, then in Chapter 4, the significance of the financial crisis will be used to make 
conclusion and analysis in Chapter 5. 
The purpose of this paper is to determine an appropriate time to invest. It is 
expected there is a significant effect from financial crisis. There are several reasons for 
this: 
1. Unconfident investors accelerated worsening of the stock market. New 
companies could not get enough finances to grow and also the hesitating 
issuers over-underpriced the new stocks although the firms which these stocks 
stand for might have huge potential investment value. 
Those countries that were not or less affected by the financial crisis (Table 1) attracted 
international investors. They were considering put their money into those emerging 
markets of developing countries, looking forward to a good return while the U.S. could 
not guarantee that possibility was smaller. 




2 Angola  13,20 
3 Azerbaijan  11,60 
4 Equatorial Guinea  11,20 
4 Qatar  11,20 
5 Anguilla  10,20 
6 Turkmenistan 10,00 
7 Iraq  9,80 
7 China 9,80 
8 Peru 9,20 
8 Belarus 9,20 
9 Uzbekistan 8,90 
9 Mongolia  8,90 
10 Uruguay 8,50 
10 Kuwait  8,50 
10 Ethiopia 8,50 
11 Panama  8,30 
12 Congo, Republic of the  8,10 
13 Congo, Democratic Republic of the 8,00 
14 Tajikistan 7,90 
15 United Arab Emirates  7,70 
16 Armenia  7,60 
16 Romania 7,60 
17 Liberia  7,50 
17 Laos  7,50 
17 Afghanistan  7,50 
17 Rwanda  7,50 
18 Moldova 7,30 
18 Solomon Islands  7,30 
19 Tanzania 7,10 
19 Argentina  7,10 
20 Madagascar  7,00 
20 Lebanon  7,00 
20 Gibraltar  7,00 
Table 1: GDP - real growth rates (%) 2009 Country Ranks 
Resources: CIA World Factbook 
The U.S. government was becoming more cautious; stricter regulations were enacted that 






Literature of Review 
A market which is undergoing rapid growth needs excessive capital to support its 
development. This feature matches the American market in the 1950s. The IPO was not 
popular at that time; however, it provided a potential stream for those companies which 
wanted to go public and obtain capital, the only thing was, they did not realize yet. IPO 
was commonly admitted and accepted in 1980s. Although stocks issued in initial day will 
always be underpriced, many firms through whole business sectors had shown their 
interest in IPO as it was a quick way to raise capital. Until 9/11, 2001, the number of new 
firms of going public in U.S. suddenly dropped (Figure 2).  
The earliest research on IPO underpricing had been done by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in 1963. Later, such works continued. Jay R. Ritter has been working 
in the IPO area for many years and his works impact strongly on this issue. He focused 
on underpricing in new stocks; the average initial return rates in 1998 and 2002 have 
been calculated. In 2003, after collecting IPO data from 38 countries, he concluded 
developing countries had higher average initial return than developed countries, while 
Asian countries (including Japan) had more underpricing than western countries. 
Ljungqvist (2005) analyzed the average initial return rates for the decades from 1960s to 
2000s are 21%, 12%, 16%, 21%, 40% respectively. It seems there is a common view on 
IPO underpricing among analysts and researchers, because underpricing exists in 




New stocks always are underpriced, and this is the first rationale. Why? Ritter (1998) 
explained, generally, there were some measures to show to what extent the stock had 
been underpriced. The large initial returns (the price change measured from the offering 
price to the market price on the first trading day) was a well-known measure that was 
highly related to IPO, and it was very useful to the investors in new issues. Based on the 
return, investors would know how well the stocks are performing. Many studies and 
research had been done and recorded the results in each period, showing that the 
distribution of initial returns is highly skewed, with a positive mean and a median near 
zero. In the U.S., the mean initial return is almost 15 percent. It reflected that, back to the 
end of the last century, people could make profits from new stocks in the first day; on the 
other hand, the U.S. financial market was running normally. Another measure was that a 
sort of cycle, like a business cycle, could be found in both average initial return and 
average initial volume. High initial returns tend to stay close by rising IPO volume seen 
from past records.  The third measure related to IPOs is the price of the new issues would 
not perform well in the long run. Histogram is that paper displayed that companies which 
were going public from 1970 to 1993 produced an average return of 7.9 percent per year 
for the first five years after they went public, using the first closing market price as the 
purchase price. There was a control group of non-issuing firms, matched by market 
capitalization, which produced average annual returns of 13.1 percent, while IPOs only 
had 5.2 percent per year in the first five years.  
There are several hypothesizes on IPO underpricing. Rock (1986) explained Winner’s 
Hypothesis. He assumed two types of investors were in the market, informed investors 




informed investor acknowledged the new issues had huge value to invest, they would buy 
a large number of shares; as a result, those uninformed investors would be pushed out 
from the market. Therefore, investment bankers had to downprice IPOs until it 
compensated the loss from adverse selection by uninformed investors.   
Chemanur (1993) tested the Dynamic Information Acquisition Hypothesis. He concluded, 
there was information asymmetry between issuers and exterior investors. Insiders knew 
exact information inside the issuing companies while exterior investors did not. Good 
companies wanted investors to get its investment value. Yet, for those investors, if they 
planned to know more about the company, they were required to pay more on that. 
Finally, insiders had to underprice in order to attract more outsiders to acquire inside 
information, and then put that information into the secondary market. Good companies 
could distinguish themselves from bad companies through underpricing.  
Baron (1982) proved Theories Focusing on Agency Cost. The assumption was, issuing 
companies know less information about markets than issuers. If companies asked issuers 
to make the best to sell stocks, they had to concede issuers to underprice since it was not 
wise to monitor issuers without cost budgeting. Nevertheless, Muscarella and Vetsuypens 
(1989) realized when investment banks themselves went public, there was not such a 
monitoring problem, but their IPOs were still underpriced. This opinion did not either 
support or refute Baron’s research because issuers (also issuing companies) could say 
proper underpricing was the typical cost.  
Carter and Manaster (1990) used U.S. IPO data of the 1980s to develop the Underwriter 




risk signal on issuing companies. Generally, investment banks with high reputation 
would deny issuing IPOs for those young entrepreneurs who had high risks. That was 
why those issuers had smaller underpricing. Later, Cooney, Singh, Carter and Dark (2001) 
and Loughran and Ritter (2004) found that it was contradicted by the negative correlation 
between reputation of issuers and IPO underpricing. After the 1990s, during the dot-
bubble period, the correlation was positive. They deduced it was possible that issuers had 
lowered the issuing standard; thus many risky firms went public. Issuers aimed to enlarge 
each IPO market shares, and got more services fee from intermediate business. 
Dewenter, Novaes and Pettway (1999) introduced Theories Focusing on Interests 
Conflicts. They noticed when studying Japanese IPOs that if too many companies had 
cross-holdings, underpricing would get bigger. Because of potential interests conflicts, 
big underpricing was a market reaction that resulted from opaque and complicated 
relationships among Japanese firms. Hamao and Hoshi (1999) analyzed Japanese 
corporate bonds and found the similar phenomenon. If the bond issuer belonged to one of 
the Japanese banks, and this bank was the issuing company at the same time, the IPO 
underpricing would be lower. They also saw that if there was a kind of interest 
relationship between venture investors and issuers, underpricing tended to be higher. 
However, there was little reference that mentioned such a relationship exists in western 
world. 
Ritter (1984) and Aggarwal and Conroy (2000) had expanded Market Climate 
Hypothesis. In this theory, when the market was growing, the uncertainty of the market 
would be greater and thus it was hard to assess the risks in the market which made 




more underpricing than in other periods in order to induce investors to step into the 
market.   
Each country has its own underpricing. Ritter (2003) found IPO total spread in Europe 
was lower than in the U.S., as well as initial return aggregation. Blidik and Yimaz (2005) 
in their paper pointed out there were two reasons for lower underpricing. The first was 
intensive competition among investment bankers. When IPOs were not much, those 
bankers would try their best to get underwriting. Therefore, average initial return fell. The 
second reason was the allocation of new issues after going public. If new issues would be 
allocated to more investors and more average, the underpricing would be lower. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, the number of IPOs in the U.S. was smaller after a financial 
crisis; if these two reasons are correct, then initial return rate might decrease. 
Research shows a series of factors related to underpricing, including timing, the number 
of investors and potential investors, the leverage of stocks controlled by big shareholders 
or managements, the power of venture-backed, geographic difference and so on. Ritter 
(1991) reported, industrial underpricing differs when time changed. The biggest level of 
underpricing was accompanied by the biggest volume of IPOs at the same period. Zheng 
and Li (2008) found initial return rate was positive correlated to the number of non-
institutional investors, and negative correlated to the change in the number of total 
shareholders. Megginson and Weiss (1991) reported, the underpricing of IPOs with 
venture-backed were lower than those IPOs without venture-backed. They showed IPO 
certification had a very strong influence on reliving underpricing. IPO underpricing 




Since new stocks have to be underpriced, how do investment bankers determine initial 
price? Here is the second rationale. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) found, most companies 
could choose not hiring any underwriters. It seemed by doing this, they could reduce the 
difference between initial price and open price, thus the issuing company got more. But if 
underwriters existed, they were able to avoid selling IPOs to the same investors because 
of rules changed by underwriters if the same investors auctioned, which ensured the 
whole issuing process effectively. Moreover, underwriter would use a lever which could 
reduce IPO expected underpricing by knowing the market information from regular 
investors. There were two kinds of contracts between issuing company and underwriter, 
namely, firm-commitment contract and best-effort contract. Due to risk of preselling the 
stocks, issuing companies needed to spend a certain cost on negotiating with underwriters, 
which was a best-effort contract, in order to reduce the incentive of reselling, thus 
underpricing would not be that severe. In firm-commitment contract, underwriters own 
the interests from IPO, and that provided a good reason to presell those new stocks. 
Compared to best-effort contract, the firm-commitment contract was the cheapest. These 
two contracts were opposite, according to the level of tolerating risks on a underwriter 
and the size and perspective of a company; it was hard to say which contract is better. 
Rock (1986) created a model to test minimum-sales constraint by using several 
implications. In the conclusion, he found the size of the constraint should be inversely 
related to underpricing. 
IPO has risks to issuing companies, but researches about analyzing the reasons why 
companies are so eager to go public were rare, until Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) 




information being not all-inclusive and important variables which only existed in post-
ante information, the issue would be solved by combining two kinds of information. By 
doing this topic on the data from 2,181 companies in the Italian stock market (Italy was 
similar to other industrial countries and the public information in Italy was comparatively 
transparent), they found two main factors that would be considered as signals to make 
firms decide if it was good to go public. The first was market-to-book ratio. After 
calculation, it came out that by increasing 1 percent in market-to-book ratio, the 
probability of going public would add another 25%. The second was the size of the 
company. Big companies usually tended to go public.  
Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) first introduced the event study method. This 
methodology now has become the most prevalent tool in analyzing economic problems, 
especially in IPOs and econometrics. A financial crisis can be regarded as an event, 













3.1 Data Selection 
A sample of 343 U.S. stocks in financial sector was picked up from Bloomberg and 
Yahoo! Finance sources between June 1st, 2006 and August 31st, 2008. The sample is 
then divided into two groups: 153 stocks for pre-2008 period and the rest of them for 
after 2008 period. The year 2008 is selected as the event period since major bankruptcies 
occurred in and after this period. The reason for selecting the financial sector as sample 
set is, compared to the other sectors of market, this sector suffered severity from the 
subprime loan crisis. According to NYSE news report in 2008, 1,416,902 people were 
filed for bankruptcy and most of them were from financial sector.  
Although so many firms declared bankruptcy in 2008, IPO kept developing in this 
unpleasant time. The U.S. government had done a lot of works on adjusting policies, and 
bailing out companies. As the consequence, the domestic economy, especially 
infrastructure industry did not get a deadly shock, unlike in 1930s. Moreover, under the 
good business environment, the data reflected IPOs are acceptable. Thus, the results in 
this paper would be convictive. 
3.2 Regression Model 
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          ······················ 3.1 
Where     is the initial return rate of stock i; 
    is the initial price or offer price of stock i in initial day; 
    is the closing price of stock I in initial day. 
The initial return is considered as dependent variable. There are several variables that 
related to initial return: offer price, closing price in initial day, issuing volume, 
company’s age till going public, and PE ratio.  
A company with longer time before going public, the less underpricing it would get, by 
considering reputation or other intangible assets.  When investors want to take a look on a 
firm’s value of investing, the common measurement is PE ratio. If the ratio is big, that 
means investors are paying too much on this firm’s stocks. Therefore, it is supposed to be 
negative correlated to IR.  If a company is issuing more shares than other companies, 
then more investors can buy its stocks. Since the stock can be well allocated, the 
underpricing would become lower. 
The model is below: 
                                                    · · 3.2 
Where   is the interception of regression; 
   (1 ≤ n ≤ 6) is the coefficients for each term; 




        is the time between established and went public of company i after natural 
logarithmized. The reason for logarithmic analysis is due to high fluctuation of age data. 
After modified, the number would be flatter or more linear. 
         is the natural logarithmic IPO size of stock i. 
D is a dummy variable, stands for the effect of financial crisis. 
   is the error term of stock i.  
In addition, dummy variable D have to be further defined. As mentioned above, the year 
of 2008 is the boundary of financial crisis. Thus, in the years of 2006 and 2007, the 
dummy variable D is 0. It assumes that financial crisis does not happen yet. Begin from 
2008, D is 1, because the financial crisis urges. 
This model might not very accurate to test if financial crisis does affect financial sector. 
In general, according to those financial reports which were broadcasted in the past few 
years, the global market seemed to be unstable: slowly growing GDP in developed 
countries, conservative international businesses, declines in world exports and imports, 
and so on. If the significance of dummy variable was not obvious, say, the effect of crisis 
could be neglected in financial market, it should be resulted from the data set being small 








Results and Analysis 
A Brief Introduction 
4.1 The Result of Regression 
IR Coefficient P>︱t︱ 
Last Price in 
Initial Day 
0.0268 0.000 
Log(Volume) - 0.0084 0.208 
Log(Age) 0.0217 0.088 
PE Ratio - 0.0000 0.938 
Offer Price - 0.0285 0.000 
D - 0.0508 0.116 
Constant 0.1607 0.074 
Table 2 
After data has been imported into STATA by employing ordinary least square method, 
the result is displayed above. In Table 2, the sign of each coefficient, or     is expected to 
be right before results obtained. However, there comes another question, do those 
variables, including dummy variable D, have significant relationship to initial return rate?  
Using a 5% level of significance, only last price in initial day and offer price have very 
strong significance which P-values of both variables are close to 0, while other two 




dropped out in this model. The issuing size, which has 0.208 of P-value, also seems not to 
be related to IR. The rest of variables, age and D, shows a little significance, although 
they have lower 0.088 and 0.116 of P-values respectively.  
In summary, the model fails to test the effect of financial crisis of 2008. The model may 
be not efficient due to lack of other important variables, so that the result of regression 

















4.2 Limitation of the Model 
1. The time of crisis lasting  
The model has set the year of 2008 as financial crisis happened. Actually, this crisis 
started in 2006. However, people did not recognize it at that moment because it was not 
that severe compared to 2008. If we count from 2006 to 2010, it is only 5-years long, and 
no one could say the financial crisis has finished. If there is a bigger time span for the 
crisis, like a decade or even more, and using huge amount of data to calculate, then the 
convergence of results would be more obvious. A better way to test financial crisis is 
create three control groups, before crisis, during crisis and after crisis. 
2. Unpublicized information 
Since crisis was taking its toll, some companies, more or less, chose not to tell the details 
to the market about their operating status, gain or loss. It is reasonable; people do not 
want their disadvantages reported. But it is not good to those investors; they do not know 
what exactly happened on the company which they were investing. Is it still worth to 
invest? What is the prospective view of this company? They can only get information 
from public resources, but no one can be sure whether the information is reflecting the 
real situation or not. 
3. Behavioural finance 
People’s psychological reaction is very hard to prediction. The most famous theory is 
Sheep-Flock Effect, which commonly exists in global markets. People are always 




wrong clue, the market would be very volatile. Sometimes, some people did not change 
their strategies timely because they had strong beliefs on some certain companies rather 
than fail to switch. This kind of factor cannot be quantified. In order to solve this problem 
is to get effective factors as much as possible to make it insignificant or less affect the 


















Conclusion and Recommendation 
According the results of STATA, it is clear that the variables in this model are not very 
significant to the initial return rate. However, it shows that the financial crisis had some 
influence on financial sector, though it is not distinct. Furthermore, the model has proved 
both issuing size and financial crisis have negative relationships to the financial market. 
By analyzing the results, if a company plans to sell its stocks in a big amount that would 
turn out into low underpricing since more investors have chances to get the shares. Once 
the market reach the equilibrium, the price of the stock would be more effective. Same 
thing happened on financial crisis. With the existence of crisis, if the crisis is getting 
more destructive, or damaged a lot to the national economy, the initial return would be 
lower. Because public do not have too much confidence so that people start to invest less 
or even stop. The investment bankers, who always play a role of issuers, will probably 
make discounts on the stock and suffer the loss alone if the market is too bad. When the 
financial crisis shocked the public, American government made their efforts on reducing 
the wave of the financial tsunami, and the economy was accompanied with 
comprehensive and mature regulations, thus the whole market was not declining like a 
bungee jumping. When this possibility in mind, it can answer that why the effect 
financial crisis in 2008 is not significant. The measures that the U.S. government has 
taken offset the bad affects from the crisis. 
Above all, the data used in this paper is not enough, and less effective variables made the 




time, they are able to be risk-averse. Although the market seems to be depressed, it is still 
stable. Investors could put their capital into the market to stimulate the rebuilding of the 
economy. Because it is very time to restore public’s confidence and national power. 
Therefore, strengthen companies’ credit records and improve social wealth would be the 
objectives for the public companies and federal government. By doing so, economy gets 
recovery will not take long. Meanwhile, other countries which were affected by financial 
crisis need find a way that match their features and domestic needs. Once countries 
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06/09/2006 36.23 381800 15.3517 36.1 8  0.0036 
EGP US 
Equity 
08/09/2006 49.67 152500 63.6795 49 37  0.0136 
O US 
Equity 
08/09/2006 24.61 536000 24.0332 24.32 21  0.0119 
ACC US 
Equity 
12/09/2006 24.68 126100 154.25 24.6 15  0.0032 
FRT US 
Equity 
14/09/2006 74.6 159000 46.9182 74.9 44  -0.0040 
DRH US 
Equity 
21/09/2006 16.3851 357102 28.7288 17.1 2  -0.0418 
ACAS US 
Equity 
22/09/2006 28.9873 943538 12.0688 37.33 20  -0.2234 
PNBK US 
Equity 
25/09/2006 25.6 15576 47.4074 22 12  0.1636 
ARE US 
Equity 
26/09/2006 94.55 143200 45.2392 94.75 4  -0.0021 
DLR US 
Equity 
28/09/2006 30.52 249500 121.1111 30.5 5  0.0006 
EF US 
Equity 
29/09/2006 12.51 19516 19.2462 12.5 19  0.0008 
HALL US 
Equity 
03/10/2006 10.15 6100 17.8697 9 19  0.1277 
LBAI US 
Equity 
05/10/2006 12.7589 47934 16.4459 12 37  0.0632 
MCGC US 
Equity 
10/10/2006 16 332819 9.3023 15.75 8  0.0158 
O US 
Equity 
18/10/2006 26.02 1112100 24.6869 26.4 21  -0.0143 
HTGC US 
Equity 
20/10/2006 13.39 89773 19.9943 13 3  0.03 
NCT US 
Equity 
27/10/2006 29.5 420900 11.4341 29.42 8  0.0027 
FUR US 
Equity 
30/10/2006 30.3 11460 17.6674 6 45  4.05 
CT US 
Equity 






06/11/2006 30.1 938700 43.6232 29.85 21  0.0083 
SFI US 
Equity 
09/11/2006 45 442800 18.9514 44.5 13  0.0112 
SNH US 
Equity 
14/11/2006 22.04 172600 24.3886 22.06 8  -0.0009 
MRLN US 
Equity 
15/11/2006 23 28576 14.557 22 9  0.0454 
NRF US 
Equity 
16/11/2006 13.7482 669846 21.3571 14.95 9  -0.0803 
DLR US 
Equity 
28/11/2006 35.48 364300 159.8198 35.85 5  -0.0103 
SSS US 
Equity 
29/11/2006 58.04 472300 30.5474 56.25 24  0.0318 
SLG US 
Equity 
30/11/2006 135.24 1036200 70.0725 134.5 26  0.0055 
CNS US 
Equity 
30/11/2006 37.95 202100 33.5841 36.5 20  0.03972 
DDR US 
Equity 
04/12/2006 59.7225 655094 45.9097 64.66 41  -0.0763 
BRT US 
Equity 




05/12/2006 22.25 200 15.2397 22 96  0.01136 
VNO US 
Equity 
06/12/2006 120.787 1427503 39.8413 125 24  -0.0337 
HTGC US 
Equity 
07/12/2006 13.99 56829 20.8903 13.6 3  0.02867 
PKY US 
Equity 
12/12/2006 50.9 168700 57.8409 50.25 35  0.01293 
ARCC US 
Equity 
13/12/2006 17.9356 336210 15.0726 18.5 2  -0.0305 
CDR US 
Equity 
14/12/2006 16.21 46000 81.05 16 22  0.0131 
RSO US 
Equity 
14/12/2006 16.84 146100 12.927 16.5 1  0.0206 
PSEC US 
Equity 
15/12/2006 17.7 114292 13.209 17.7 18  0 
SPPR US 
Equity 
18/12/2006 6.84 12850 34.2 6.7 12  0.0208 
HPT US 
Equity 
18/12/2006 44.5981 327100 22.299 47.15 11  -0.0541 
ACAS US 
Equity 
08/01/2007 34.399 1558080 14.7363 45.83 21  -0.2494 
AVB US 
Equity 






11/01/2007 22.44 598491 13.9379 22.44 17  0 
HCP US 
Equity 
16/01/2007 39.4 1214900 78.8 38.58 22  0.0212 
NFP US 
Equity 
17/01/2007 47.1 2012400 19.625 46.35 9  0.0161 
NCT US 
Equity 
17/01/2007 31.76 236000 11.8951 31.3 9  0.01469 
DRH US 
Equity 
17/01/2007 17.6611 907445 37.2857 18.15 3  -0.0269 
RAS US 
Equity 
18/01/2007 103.59 322700 16.4429 34 10  2.0467 
COBZ US 
Equity 
18/01/2007 20.9 36806 20.2913 20.9 27  0 
TWGP US 
Equity 
22/01/2007 31.76 395142 19.6049 31.25 14  0.0163 
CLI US 
Equity 
02/02/2007 54.68 1611000 40.5037 54.18 58  0.0092 
ARCC US 
Equity 
06/02/2007 19.1543 551017 15.5938 19.95 3  -0.0398 
SNH US 
Equity 
07/02/2007 26.75 2409200 26.0189 26.49 8  0.0098 
HPT US 
Equity 
13/02/2007 47.84 519327 23.5665 47.67 12  0.0035 
MVC US 
Equity 
23/02/2007 16.35 127700 5.7774 16.25 8  0.0061 
DLLR US 
Equity 
23/02/2007 18.6 2519432 24.0517 28.15 17  -0.3392 
MPW US 
Equity 
23/02/2007 15.61 1033800 20.5395 15.6 4  0.0006 
NLY US 
Equity 
07/03/2007 13.63 4161900 18.6712 13.5 11  0.0096 
ACAS US 
Equity 
20/03/2007 33.5583 1477819 14.3762 44.71 22  -0.2494 
NNN US 
Equity 
22/03/2007 24.88 3470300 20.9958 24.7 23  0.0072 
OHI US 
Equity 
29/03/2007 16.93 157000 23.1918 16.75 15  0.0107 
ARCC US 
Equity 
29/03/2007 17.2446 251500 14.0391 17.97 3  -0.0403 
NCT US 
Equity 
05/04/2007 28.18 2028900 10.3223 27.75 9  0.0154 
PBCT US 
Equity 
11/04/2007 20.7381 2964919 46.3298 20 165  0.0369 
HCN US 
Equity 






18/04/2007 12 505900 32.0856 11.75 39  0.0212 
MCGC US 
Equity 
25/04/2007 18.02 500692 10.538 18.15 17  -0.0071 
GLAD US 
Equity 
27/04/2007 24.18 96063 14.0581 24.25 6  -0.0028 
ESS US 
Equity 
04/05/2007 127.3 1180100 85.4362 128.6
5 
36  -0.0104 
RNST US 
Equity 
08/05/2007 22.63 16734 12.9561 22.5 103  0.0057 
VTR US 
Equity 
17/05/2007 40.55 685300 32.1825 40.5 23  0.0012 
LSE US 
Equity 
22/05/2007 10.75 186900 134.375 10.75 13  0 
WRE US 
Equity 
01/06/2007 36.97 545600 47.3974 37 47  -0.0008 
HTGC US 
Equity 
04/06/2007 13.87 129164 16.3176 13.5 4  0.0274 
ABR US 
Equity 
07/06/2007 27.55 200100 10.3571 27.65 4  -0.0036 
ACAS US 
Equity 
18/06/2007 33.8135 1740386 14.6743 45.5 21  -0.2568 
TICC US 
Equity 
10/07/2007 15.41 122244 11.0071 15.4 4  0.0006 
NLY US 
Equity 
12/07/2007 14.19 2273200 13.6442 14 11  0.0135 
MIG US 
Equity 
18/07/2007 9.65 1483600 12.0625 9.65 52  0 
ARCC US 
Equity 
23/08/2007 15.6516 637767 11.1712 16.3 3  -0.0397 
MFA US 
Equity 
06/09/2007 7.39 840800 22.3939 7.25 52  0.0193 
ACAS US 
Equity 
07/09/2007 29.0098 2154542 12.1924 39.4 21  -0.2637 
NATL US 
Equity 
07/09/2007 30.62 119426 15.0098 30 18  0.0206 
AINV US 
Equity 
12/09/2007 20.005 1617554 10.8723 20 3  0.0002 
ARE US 
Equity 
19/09/2007 99.89 313900 46.4605 96 14  0.0405 
MCGC US 
Equity 
19/09/2007 14.33 518904 7.6223 14.5 17  -0.0117 
LUK US 
Equity 
20/09/2007 45.77 1137400 217.9524 45.5 163  0.0059 
GKK US 
Equity 






25/09/2007 26.3 865100 75.4446 24.85 15  0.0583 
DRE US 
Equity 
28/09/2007 33.81 15514500 45.6892 33.26 35  0.0165 
HCP US 
Equity 
02/10/2007 34.99 936300 102.9118 33.67 22  0.0392 
CIA US 
Equity 
09/10/2007 8.53 87400 29.4138 8 179  0.0662 
EPR US 
Equity 
09/10/2007 56.17 219400 20.5751 54 10  0.0401 
NNN US 
Equity 
10/10/2007 26.04 893100 20.5039 25.94 23  0.0038 
NLY US 
Equity 
11/10/2007 15.34 5839700 13.2241 15.1 11  0.0158 
PSEC US 
Equity 
11/10/2007 16.34 310397 10.8933 16.34 19  0 
CWH US 
Equity 
16/10/2007 39.92 255575 38.3846 10.07 21  2.9642 
GLAD US 
Equity 
16/10/2007 18.51 30740 10.9527 18.7 6  -0.0101 
DLR US 
Equity 
16/10/2007 39.38 365500 281.2857 39.38 6  0 
IRET US 
Equity 
18/10/2007 10.68 115589 53.4 10.2 37  0.0470 
MFA US 
Equity 
08/11/2007 8.09 1486875 67.4167 7.95 10  0.0176 
NDAQ US 
Equity 
08/11/2007 45.4 4556564 35.1938 43.26 36  0.0494 
ACAS US 
Equity 
16/11/2007 29.2125 2549016 12.1246 39.43 21  -0.2591 
HCN US 
Equity 
04/12/2007 42.65 2775615 38.0804 42.14 37  0.0121 
SNH US 
Equity 
12/12/2007 22.61 946717 20.1875 22.81 9  -0.0087 
SFI US 
Equity 
13/12/2007 28.41 3509040 11.5488 28.41 14  0 
FRT US 
Equity 
20/12/2007 81.25 3482900 53.4539 81.21 45  0.0004 
SLM US 
Equity 
27/12/2007 19.65 42940069 8.0533 19.65 35  0 
MFA US 
Equity 
17/01/2008 9.43 2124268 44.9048 9.25 11  0.0194 
NLY US 
Equity 
23/01/2008 19.67 15823539 15.4882 19.25 12  0.0218 
VTR US 
Equity 






30/01/2008 17.28 108268 10.1647 17 7  0.0164 
MBI US 
Equity 
07/02/2008 14.2 7568663 17.9747 12.15 35  0.1687 
SNH US 
Equity 
21/02/2008 21.65 564508 20.0463 21.85 10  -0.0091 
JOE US 
Equity 
26/02/2008 39.68 560722 101.7436 35 72  0.1337 
HCN US 
Equity 
05/03/2008 41.1 1103271 35.431 41.44 38  -0.0082 
SF US 
Equity 
17/03/2008 17.9156 412477 10.3625 40 118  -0.5521 
MPW US 
Equity 
19/03/2008 10.85 1107380 18.7069 10.75 5  0.0093 
CT US 
Equity 
24/03/2008 30.2 178850 7.7436 28.75 11  0.0504 
ACAS US 
Equity 
25/03/2008 27.3285 2586123 10.8687 36.41 22  -0.2494 
HCP US 
Equity 
26/03/2008 34 4195219 73.913 33.32 23  0.0204 
EPR US 
Equity 
27/03/2008 48.18 1961338 16.9648 48.18 11  0 
PSEC US 
Equity 
27/03/2008 15.05 114112 9.2331 15.45 20  -0.0258 
HCP US 
Equity 
28/03/2008 32.82 4195219 71.3478 32.78 23  0.0012 
KFN US 
Equity 
02/04/2008 11.91 1335300 5.9283 11.85 4  0.0050 
NGPC US 
Equity 
10/04/2008 16.17 67383 15.1121 16 4  0.0106 
ACC US 
Equity 
17/04/2008 29.1 278714 103.9286 28.75 17  0.0121 
BMR US 
Equity 
17/04/2008 25.57 740269 32.7821 25.5 4  0.0027 
EGP US 
Equity 
24/04/2008 48.57 778101 43.7568 49.25 39  -0.0138 
IBKR US 
Equity 









13/05/2008 16.38 3355923 10.7763 16.15 12  0.0142 
HT US 
Equity 
13/05/2008 9.8 137982 39.2 9.9 10  -0.0101 
AINV US 
Equity 






13/05/2008 16.77 382126 31.0556 16.35 31  0.0256 
NYB US 
Equity 
19/05/2008 19.69 2959747 22.375 19.35 149  0.0175 
WRE US 
Equity 
20/05/2008 34.5 349830 59.4828 34.8 48  -0.0086 
MFA US 
Equity 
28/05/2008 7.05 1175953 22.7419 6.95 11  0.0143 
PSEC US 
Equity 
28/05/2008 14.5 91703 8.011 14.9 11  -0.0268 
STT US 
Equity 
03/06/2008 71.36 3114466 14.3006 70 176  0.0194 
SNH US 
Equity 
03/06/2008 21.09 970921 19.3486 21.09 10  0 
CRBC US 
Equity 
05/06/2008 43.9 649187 3.9909 40 137  0.0975 
PVTB US 
Equity 
05/06/2008 35.21 400719 130.4074 34 19  0.0355 
CLBH US 
Equity 
09/06/2008 9.8 1700 10.6522 9 12  0.0888 
KEY US 
Equity 
12/06/2008 11.98 39924036 6.4064 11.75 14  0.0195 
BFS US 
Equity 
19/06/2008 47.65 24948 29.4136 46.5 116  0.0247 
CSE US 
Equity 
23/06/2008 11.19 9308775 20.3455 11 8  0.0172 
HCN US 
Equity 
01/07/2008 44.17 2644441 35.336 42.49
8 
38  0.0393 
DLR US 
Equity 
16/07/2008 39.66 1436214 495.75 38.42 4  0.0322 
BPFH US 
Equity 
23/07/2008 6.89 2569005 20.2647 6 20  0.1483 
EPR US 
Equity 
31/07/2008 53.64 293040 17.4723 50.96 11  0.0525 
HCP US 
Equity 
06/08/2008 34.57 3153291 75.1522 33.5 23  0.0319 
VTR US 
Equity 
12/08/2008 45.62 1644434 48.0211 46 25  -0.0082 
HCN US 
Equity 
04/09/2008 48 2359063 40.08 48 38 0 
SBNY US 
Equity 
08/09/2008 30.07 559512 20.125 29 7 0.0368 
KIM US 
Equity 
09/09/2008 37.6 5979250 32.4634 37.1 24 0.0134 
ZION US 
Equity 






16/09/2008 17.76 1791745 20.7963 16.37 16 0.0849 
HR US 
Equity 
23/09/2008 25.9 1458751 94.8276 25.5 16 0.0156 
SF US 
Equity 
24/09/2008 32.14 346287 18.0233 45 118 -0.2857 
OFC US 
Equity 
24/09/2008 39.2 705244 81.6735 39 20 0.0051 
O US 
Equity 
25/09/2008 26.62 1299730 28.5319 26.82 39 -0.0074 
FNFG US 
Equity 





17.7353 40.5 185 0.1911 
NNN US 
Equity 
26/09/2008 23.87 1244210 20.0506 23.05 24 0.0355 
BMR US 
Equity 
01/10/2008 25.07 3690275 32.9868 24.93 4 0.0056 
WRI US 
Equity 
02/10/2008 32.34 828239 32.4815 34.2 60 -0.0543 
EXR US 
Equity 
03/10/2008 14.17 782402 32 14.71 31 -0.0367 
BAC US 
Equity 
07/10/2008 23.77 82460164 28.0174 22 134 0.0804 
BHLB US 
Equity 
08/10/2008 24.73 87848 14.4 24 162 0.0304 
RGA US 
Equity 
29/10/2008 33.99 3762997 5.5813 33.89 35 0.0029 
FCF US 
Equity 
31/10/2008 11.03 770495 15.4583 10 26 0.103 
WFC US 
Equity 
06/11/2008 28.77 53894996 15.0857 27 79 0.0655 
CBG US 
Equity 
12/11/2008 3.77 5088425 5.3894 3.77 79 0 
GBCI US 
Equity 
13/11/2008 17.73 225877 15.5692 15.5 11 0.1438 
IBKC US 
Equity 
11/12/2008 42.83 112932 15.3205 40 121 0.0707 
SNH US 
Equity 
04/02/2009 16.57 2190812 16.1835 17.3 11 -0.0422 
DLR US 
Equity 
10/02/2009 32.87 1599600 95.6486 34 5 -0.0332 
ARE US 
Equity 
19/03/2009 37.35 1427878 15.3566 38.25 16 -0.0235 
SPG US 
Equity 






25/03/2009 14.15 5121851 8.2617 12.15 26 0.1646 
GS US 
Equity 
14/04/2009 115.11 36460715 27.0582 123 140 -0.0641 
DRE US 
Equity 
16/04/2009 9.31 6202966 40.1905 7.65 37 0.2169 
WRI US 
Equity 
17/04/2009 16.25 4249391 12.9587 14.25 61 0.1403 
REG US 
Equity 
21/04/2009 36.46 3150817 20.4925 32.5 46 0.1218 
VNO US 
Equity 
22/04/2009 44.3444 10409101 205.1689 43 11 0.0312 
PSEC US 
Equity 
22/04/2009 7.95 238298 4.2105 7.75 11 0.0258 
TCAP US 
Equity 
22/04/2009 10.06 10314 6.864 10.75 7 -0.0641 
LHO US 
Equity 
23/04/2009 11.11 3281584 58.4737 10.1 11 0.1 
HST US 
Equity 
24/04/2009 7.6179 38667780 16.5116 6.6 82 0.1542 
CPT US 
Equity 
06/05/2009 30.47 1911142 75.8718 27.5 16 0.108 
SPG US 
Equity 





13.1005 22 80 0.2809 
BK US 
Equity 
11/05/2009 29.55 18686454 10.0853 28.75 225 0.0278 
USB US 
Equity 





57.6596 27.75 16 -0.0234 
PFG US 
Equity 
11/05/2009 20.34 8229611 6.2585 19.75 130 0.0298 
BBT US 
Equity 
12/05/2009 22.5 17487105 9.8145 20 137 0.125 
SCBT US 
Equity 
12/05/2009 23.2 58495 13.2615 23 76 0.0086 
STT US 
Equity 





22.1406 10.77 135 0.0445 
IVZ US 
Equity 
19/05/2009 14 4519769 15.7374 14 74 0 
SHO US 
Equity 











27/05/2009 21.66 1533166 44.8462 21.5 31 0.0074 
RWT US 
Equity 
27/05/2009 14.86 1927041 16.4 14.5 15 0.0248 
MAIN US 
Equity 
28/05/2009 12.05 31805 12.1193 12.1 12 -0.0041 
KRC US 
Equity 
29/05/2009 21.29 745242 25.6706 20 62 0.0645 
AXP US 
Equity 
01/06/2009 25.99 21602766 12.2019 25.25 159 0.0293 
STI US 
Equity 
01/06/2009 13.8 34004295 19.4366 13 24 0.0615 
JPM US 
Equity 
02/06/2009 34.5 90184473 35.7525 35.25 186 -0.0212 
SBNY US 
Equity 
02/06/2009 26.17 317855 19.3071 26 8 0.0065 
DCT US 
Equity 
02/06/2009 4.3 3153492 234 4.25 7 0.0117 
FFBC US 
Equity 
03/06/2009 7.97 210101 14.2419 7.5 16 0.0626 
PRU US 
Equity 
03/06/2009 40.51 10708139 15.3178 39 134 0.0387 
CODI US 
Equity 
04/06/2009 8.52 147422 17.6727 8.85 4 -0.0372 
PICO US 
Equity 
05/06/2009 29.22 298661 44.2727 27 28 0.0822 
FCBC US 
Equity 
05/06/2009 12.5 81832 8.788 12.5 20 0 
BXP US 
Equity 
05/06/2009 50.32 4784647 25.3636 50 39 0.0064 
CBL US 
Equity 
09/06/2009 6.57 1850607 35.1414 6 16 0.095 
PICO US 
Equity 
10/06/2009 27.95 86393 42.3485 27 28 0.0351 
FNB US 
Equity 
10/06/2009 6.15 243304 15.5333 5.5 35 0.1181 
JLL US 
Equity 
10/06/2009 35.66 711338 14.562 35 12 0.0188 
LHO US 
Equity 
10/06/2009 14.71 1012022 85.2105 14.75 11 -0.0027 
HPT US 
Equity 
18/06/2009 11.68 1341391 9.708 11.5 14 0.0156 
ELS US 
Equity 






30/06/2009 39.41 199950 13.6054 39 122 0.0105 
PSEC US 
Equity 
30/06/2009 9.2 2209872 5.0829 9 11 0.0222 
JNS US 
Equity 
15/07/2009 11.39 3309754 30.1892 11 40 0.0354 
AGNC US 
Equity 
10/08/2009 22.03 1975567 4.2176 21.5 1 0.0246 
CVBF US 
Equity 
21/07/2009 6.26 1235545 9.1642 5.85 35 0.0700 
FCAL US 
Equity 
27/07/2009 5.45 5623 45.4167 5 3 0.09 
GLCH US 
Equity 
28/07/2009 6.62 251024 30.4 6.25 57 0.0592 
MBRG US 
Equity 
28/07/2009 11.63 23995 13.35 10.75 16 0.08186 
MFA US 
Equity 
29/07/2009 7.1 4805600 7.7122 7.05 12 0.0070 
CSFL US 
Equity 
29/07/2009 7.31 23200 900 6.5 20 0.1246 
GHL US 
Equity 
30/07/2009 75.61 182956 95.3452 76 13 -0.0051 
EVR US 
Equity 
04/08/2009 20.26 90742 210.8889 20.15 13 0.0054 
HCP US 
Equity 
05/05/2009 26.4 8597858 30.3908 24.75 24 0.0666 
UVSP US 
Equity 
06/08/2009 19.15 113412 18.1901 17.5 36 0.0942 
TCAP US 
Equity 
06/08/2009 10.42 89301 6.0231 10.42 7 0 
AGNC US 
Equity 
10/08/2009 24.56 625237 4.8157 23.3 1 0.0540 
SKT US 
Equity 
11/08/2009 17.855 712668 24.9085 35.5 28 -0.4970 
HPT US 
Equity 
11/08/2009 16.92 1196222 13.0993 17.25 14 -0.0191 
OCN US 
Equity 
12/08/2009 9.15 998363 12.8488 9 21 0.0166 
ARCC US 
Equity 
14/08/2009 9.22 740539 7.4692 9.25 5 -0.0032 
BBT US 
Equity 
17/08/2009 26.43 17865517 12.7067 26 137 0.0165 
HCN US 
Equity 
01/09/2009 40.08 1505167 30.2908 40.4 39 -0.0079 
SF US 
Equity 






10/09/2009 8.75 650073 9.3366 8.5 12 0.0294 
NPBC US 
Equity 
10/09/2009 6.16 3314906 8.2 5.25 135 0.1733 
UBSH US 
Equity 
10/09/2009 14.5 57228 23.0476 13.25 16 0.0943 
SNH US 
Equity 
10/09/2009 19.32 1369643 17.8198 19.44 11 -0.0061 
CUZ US 
Equity 
15/09/2009 7.4684 394647 2.9499 7.25 51 0.0301 
WAFD US 
Equity 
15/09/2009 15.21 1000672 21.4118 14.5 92 0.0489 
FFIC US 
Equity 
16/09/2009 12.35 146132 7.3216 11.5 80 0.0739 
HFWA US 
Equity 
16/09/2009 12.51 9180 66.7895 11.5 12 0.0878 
EGBN US 
Equity 
16/09/2009 8.75 29029 13.1905 8.2 12 0.0670 
FSP US 
Equity 
17/09/2009 14.76 396806 38.8421 13 18 0.1353 
ONB US 
Equity 
22/09/2009 10.65 788460 13.7297 10 175 0.065 
FFCH US 
Equity 
23/09/2009 16.3 75403 23.5753 15.5 22 0.0516 
PPS US 
Equity 
24/09/2009 18.2 691362 101.4737 17.75 38 0.0253 
METR US 
Equity 
24/09/2009 13 31864 10.1277 12 36 0.0833 
ARE US 
Equity 
24/09/2009 53.29 768613 19.2305 53.25 16 0.0007 
ATAX US 
Equity 
07/10/2009 5.25 137605 27.4737 5.05 10 0.0396 
PCBK US 
Equity 
14/10/2009 9.42 8479 58.2222 8.75 37 0.0765 
CSBC US 
Equity 
15/10/2009 5.9524 33684 78.125 5 105 0.1904 
WAC US 
Equity 
16/10/2009 14.9 120732 0.0973 14.25 51 0.0456 
HBHC US 
Equity 




23/10/2009 7.81 2700 13.0167 7 18 0.1157 
AGNC US 
Equity 
26/10/2009 28.14 538140 4.9717 26.6 1 0.0578 
OCFC US 
Equity 






02/11/2009 23.3 22998 11.1483 23 25 0.0130 
DUF US 
Equity 
05/11/2009 15.75 189072 27.1167 15.5 77 0.0161 
SFNC US 
Equity 
11/11/2009 24.52 45130 15.2431 24.5 106 0.0008 
LKFN US 
Equity 
13/11/2009 16.74 32574 16 17 137 -0.0152 
SIVB US 
Equity 
18/11/2009 39.73 366478 62.0725 38.5 27 0.0319 
GHL US 
Equity 





20/11/2009 9 6568 5.6306 8 80 0.125 
WBCO 
US Equity 
24/11/2009 9.79 15645 16.6071 9 48 0.0877 
CZNC US 
Equity 
25/11/2009 8.6 50087 6.6667 8 38 0.075 
TRMK US 
Equity 





86.9444 15 135 0.0506 
SWS US 
Equity 
03/12/2009 11.66 153474 15.0952 11.5 37 0.0139 
REG US 
Equity 
04/12/2009 33.51 1463854 43.9733 30.75 46 0.0897 
TCAP US 
Equity 
08/12/2009 11.9 61705 7.6071 12 7 -0.0083 
AINV US 
Equity 
09/12/2009 9.82 1485041 7.1127 9.82 5 0 
WFC US 
Equity 
15/12/2009 25.66 43877895 12.4951 25 80 0.0264 
NWBI US 
Equity 
15/12/2009 10.5778 271055 20.5995 10 113 0.0577 
MSL US 
Equity 
17/12/2009 13.79 5550 24.8519 12.75 25 0.0815 
MAIN US 
Equity 




20/01/2010 19.02 10802384 25.72 19 39 0.0010 
FFBC US 
Equity 
27/01/2010 15.14 439543 87.1176 15.14 17 0 
CDR US 
Equity 
02/02/2010 6.76 190597 65.1818 6.6 26 0.0242 
PNC US 
Equity 






09/02/2010 9.24 3240275 64.4592 8.16 45 0.1323 
IBKC US 
Equity 
02/03/2010 57.9 585512 57.9 57.75 123 0.0025 
PNNT US 
Equity 
02/03/2010 10.17 241255 9.8532 10 3 0.017 
EQY US 
Equity 
10/03/2010 18.41 540602 23.775 18.4 17 0.0005 
FPO US 
Equity 
16/03/2010 15.15 213455 524.6667 14.5 13 0.0448 
HIG US 
Equity 
17/03/2010 28.58 7127478 19.8978 27.75 15 0.02991 
CWH US 
Equity 
18/03/2010 30 352556 13.0723 7.25 24 3.1379 
OHI US 
Equity 
31/03/2010 19.49 3400679 23.2024 19.75 18 -0.0131 
BRE US 
Equity 
01/04/2010 35.63 1049113 127.6786 34.25 40 0.0402 
CIM US 
Equity 
01/04/2010 3.91 6669114 5.7206 3.61 3 0.0831 
EBMT US 
Equity 
05/04/2010 10.55 2751 13.4708 10 88 0.055 
PLD US 
Equity 
07/04/2010 27.53 1719877 409.1429 27.5 27 0.0010 
ADC US 
Equity 
13/04/2010 23.68 32149 12.392 22 39 0.0763 
KRC US 
Equity 
15/04/2010 34.3 551850 86.0976 34 63 0.0088 
MPW US 
Equity 
15/04/2010 9.79 358012 26.4878 9.75 7 0.0041 
MNR US 
Equity 
20/04/2010 7.69 200949 27.3 7.5 42 0.0253 
AINV US 
Equity 
27/04/2010 12.4 3509398 6.3265 12.4 6 0 
FULT US 
Equity 
30/04/2010 10.5 1399692 24.5556 10.55 28 -0.0047 
GHL US 
Equity 
03/05/2010 88.86 146016 45.5692 84.45 14 0.0522 
KFN US 
Equity 
03/05/2010 9.19 2456345 7.352 9 6 0.0211 
EPR US 
Equity 
06/05/2010 41.05 340211 253.7647 41 13 0.0012 
EVBN US 
Equity 
11/05/2010 12.35 3765 12.3964 12 22 0.0291 
DFT US 
Equity 






13/05/2010 11.5 189950 19.8254 11.5 3 0 
AGNC US 
Equity 
14/05/2010 25.55 726149 3.549 25.75 2 -0.0077 
FMER US 
Equity 
17/05/2010 19.63 5192887 23.4151 19 155 0.0331 
RSO US 
Equity 
19/05/2010 5.67 299859 8 5.25 5 0.08 
DLR US 
Equity 
02/06/2010 58.91 2302259 90.6308 57 6 0.0335 
BK US 
Equity 
03/06/2010 27.28 7625060 11.4142 27 226 0.0103 
ART US 
Equity 
03/06/2010 17.33 634615 10.5753 17.33 58 0 
SAVB US 
Equity 
10/06/2010 9.8 3353 55 9.5 21 0.0315 
CCNE US 
Equity 
14/06/2010 10.65 24158 9.2586 10.25 76 0.0390 
HFBC US 
Equity 
16/06/2010 8.6601 1210 7.75 9 76 -0.0377 
ARR US 
Equity 
16/06/2010 6.53 365932 81.625 6.75 2 -0.0325 
FSC US 
Equity 
16/06/2010 11.5 379210 11.1009 11.5 37 0 
BKCC US 
Equity 
17/06/2010 10.12 760533 7.9231 10.25 5 -0.0126 
HCP US 
Equity 
18/06/2010 32.72 2262783 36.9355 33 25 -0.0084 
ORIT US 
Equity 
22/06/2010 10.54 3758883 43.9167 10 12 0.054 
VPFG US 
Equity 
30/06/2010 9.8929 437535 62.9545 10 58 -0.0107 
FLIC US 
Equity 
14/07/2010 24.56 5561 11.9907 24 83 0.0233 
NLY US 
Equity 




30/07/2010 2 20691 24.8667 1.8 13 0.1111 
WSFS US 
Equity 
03/08/2010 37.44 19906 60.3667 36.5 178 0.0257 
FCF US 
Equity 
05/08/2010 5.05 615153 63.125 4.65 28 0.0860 
GOV US 
Equity 
05/08/2010 25.58 186922 23.7281 25 1 0.0232 
NFBK US 
Equity 






13/08/2010 14.4258 189909 4.5357 7.75 0 0.8613 
PNNT US 
Equity 
18/08/2010 10.03 222548 9.6126 10.15 3 -0.0118 
 
 
